light of recent developments within the political systems and societies of established democracies, especially under conditions of economic and political crisis.
Populists on the rise, then and now
During the recent years of crisis and austerity there has been a significant rise of populist parties in Europe, with some of them winning elections and disturbing previously established hegemonies, causing significant realignments and thus changing the rules of the (political) game. The same can be said for the US, where we have seen both populist social movements and politicians rise to prominence, posing serious challenges to the established political elites. In this sense, the 'alarming' populist challenge, that is so often discussed in the public sphere, has a 'real' concrete base, as populists of various shapes and colours are indeed gaining ground in Europe and across the world. Interestingly, this 'populist surge' has brought renewed intensity to the debate around the crisis of democracy itself and the capacity of existing institutions to express and empower citizens, upholding democracy's promise for popular sovereignty ('power to the people!'). If the people are turning to populist challengers and outsiders, who seem overly radical, or even 'extremist,' then something must be wrong with our democratic-representational systems; something is not working in the representational bond and relation between the governed and the governors, common citizens and the political elites. This, at least, seems to be a common suggestion on the lips of politicians, pundits and academics.
On the other hand, to put things in perspective, one might say that this discussion is not particularly new. Europe has found itself debating the supposedly overwhelming and unstoppable 'rise of populism' many times within the past decades, especially since the mid-1980s and the first electoral breakthrough of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the Front National (FN), in France. 2 During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the so-called 'populist radical right' had its first pan-European breakthrough, with figures like Jörg
Haider, Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, and others, joining the spotlight. 3 And there are numerous other examples of more or less known (alleged) populists that have made significant electoral gains around the same period. But it is no longer just the rightist populists that are doing well. Under the shadow of the 'Great Recession,' the picture has evolved and we have now witnessed a new surge, which is characterised by the emergence of populist parties that belong to the or 'episodic' phenomena that will soon disappear, leaving 'mainstream' parties in peace. But is this good or bad for democracy? And what are the prospects of populism from now on, in a Europe that has found itself entangled in yet another major crisis, the refugee crisis, and along with it new national isolationisms and rising xenophobia?
What is populism?
To start dealing with such questions we first have to offer a brief yet comprehensive definition of populism. I'll draw here on the emerging consensus around discursive or 'ideational' approaches to the phenomenon, in order to stress some key characteristics on which most scholars seem to agree on.
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First of all, populism seems to always entail the discursive construction and interpellation of 'the people' as a collective subject and key actor of social change. These two are the core elements of populism that one finds in most scholarly works, like the one of Ernesto Laclau, who has offered one of the most prominent theorizations of populism already from the late 1970s, 6 but also in the work of most discourse-oriented scholars. 7 Laclau understands populism as a specific type of political discourse, a 'logic' which attributes to 'the people' a protagonist position, while challenging at the same time a given power structure. He has thus stressed both the centrality of antagonism in this specific way of doing politics, as well as the role of representation; invocations of the people as well as the construction of antagonistic schemas manifest primarily on the discursive/symbolic level. Laclau has also stressed that the concepts 'people' and 'establishment' are empty signifiers, which means that they can take on different meanings depending on the speaker and the context in which they are articulated.
In this sense, populist movements and parties call upon various groups of individuals in order to link and mobilise them against a perceived 'enemy' that is somehow opposing their well-being, undermining their economic and social status, or even threatening their existence. This formal understanding of populism gives us a precise illustration of its political logic -the way in which it typically operates, articulating various discursive elements toward forming a political message and strategy -, which is useful in identifying populist actors, but it does not tell us much regarding the content of populist politics; its ideological, economic, cultural, institutional, or other aspects.
From populism's form to populism's content
Indeed, populism's contents may significantly vary, depending on the ideology to which it is attached, as well as the socio-economic and historical environment in which it emerges and develops. This explains the fact that we have historically In practice, the way in which populists (and non-populist actors) speak about 'the people,' can significantly vary, as others consider the people to be a mono-ethnic community bound by relations of common culture, language or blood, and others might see it as a political community, plural and heterogeneous, bound only by a sense of common fate and commitment to a shared set of values. Moreover, the way in which the antagonism itself with the 'enemy' is signified, can also acquire different contents and directions: in some cases, an unresponsive 'elite' can be blamed for its It should also seem rather obvious that significant differences can be traced in the ways in which the various populists construct the image of the 'enemy.' Again, in discourses such as the ones of Podemos, the Dutch Socialist Party (SP) and other leftist populist parties, the 'establishment' that is attacked is mostly defined in socioeconomic terms, as a nexus of neoliberal political, economic and media elites, both domestic and international, that favour the interests of the 'few' against the interests of the 'many.' Moving to the right, we see that in the case of the FN or the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) and others, the 'elites' (sometimes depicted as 'puppets of the EU superstate') are considered primarily as guilty for letting 'foreigners' take over the country, as irresponsible in not protecting the homogeneity and security of the nation, or even for actively conspiring against it. Thus divisions here are not so much understood in socio-economic terms (although such an agenda is all the more emphasised in the discourse of the FN), but more in cultural and ethnic terms, attacking vulnerable 'others' and minorities that are being targeted for their religion, ethnic origin or sexual orientation.
Lastly, it is crucial to stress that the ongoing research has observed that inclusive, egalitarian and/or pluralist populist parties and initiatives (usually left-leaning) tend to 
Identity formation, incorporation, representation
In this context, I believe that it is wrong -methodologically and politically -to denounce populism tout court as a pathological and anti-democratic form of politics.
Indeed, it might be better to understand it as a way -among many others -to appeal to groups of people, even to national audiences, in order to mobilise them against named opponents and at the same time a way to offer some kind of incorporation.
Now, this second aspect has not been investigated as much as it should and it needs
clarification and discussion.
This populist incorporation can be exclusive and identitarian ('you're one of us, as long as we share the same ethnic origins'), or it can be an inclusive and pluralist one ('you're one of us regardless ethnicity, religion, etc., as long as we stand together against the neoliberal elite'). Admittedly, this is a rather simplified representation of 
Concluding remarks
Given the widespread feeling that we have entered a critical juncture for democratic which has spread to the EU itself, making it a remote 'protected sphere,' unaware of people's agonies and grievances. 12 In one way or another, populist parties are gaining ground against such 'cartel' systems around Europe, and they are doing so not only in cases where economic hardship has hit hard, but also in cases where the economy has performed rather well and institutions are stable and efficient.
In the South, the populist Left has found a favourable environment to put forth demands against austerity, rising inequality and impoverishment, in favour of reincluding the marginalised social strata. In the North, the populist Right has managed to attract voters that were frustrated with mainstream parties, channelling social anxieties through identity issues, stressing the need to return to strong nation-states that provide welfare to 'their own.' In most cases, it would be impossible for such parties to succeed, if this 'gap of representation' wasn't there for them to fill; if a latent crisis of representation hadn't already challenged existing identities, political commitments and established social compromises.
To sum up, any discussion regarding the 'populist challenge' for today's Europe and Western democracies in general cannot be productive if we don't take into account the inherent ambiguity of the phenomenon: both threat and corrective, both fulfilling a democratising promise and susceptible to authoritarian turns, both progressive and regressive. The a priori demonization of populism that ignores its specific content and message, is doomed to backfire, since along with dismissing the populist 'devils,' one risks dismissing 'the people' themselves, their worries, frustrations and grievances.
Unfortunately, this is the path that has too often been chosen by mainstream political forces and intellectuals around Europe, quite characteristically in France, leading to a paradoxical self-fulfilling prophecy: by denouncing any opposition to the mainstream, by dismissing any critique to the 'moderate' forces as 'dangerous populism,' its leadership has been feeding anti-establishment actors which now take a firm reactionary stance and seem more powerful than ever. Marine Le Pen's performance in recent elections is a bitter reminder of such a dynamic. However, risky and heretical as it may sound, mainstream parties ought to take seriously the demands of populists on the various issues which they raise, from participatory democracy to transparency, and from wealth distribution and social protection to popular accountability. And they do not just have to take them into account, but they ought to respond to them with concrete policy proposals and with discourses that can aspire positive passions of hope among the citizens that struggle in conditions of stagnation and generalised impasse. After all, this is the main reason why populists are so successful: they represent certain salient societal issues against which traditional parties have remained unresponsive or even hostile.
The coming months will probably provide even more occasions to further reflect on the relation between unresponsive elites implementing unpopular policies and the rise of populist challengers. If my analysis has some validity, then I wouldn't be surprised to see populist actors doing well in forthcoming elections in countries like France, Austria and Germany. The crucial issue though has to do with the kind of demands that such populists will put forth. My suspicion is that, after crushing a left-wing alternative (namely SYRIZA), EU's key political actors have created an environment more conductive to the rise of right-wing populism. But that, of course, is rather speculation. We will have to wait and see.
